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ABSTRAK 
Artikel ini menggambarkan bagaimana proses kebijakan ekonomi dilakukan dalam 
praktek berdasarkan pengalaman di Indonesia sewaktu masa pemerintahan Megawati 
2001-2004. Pada tahun 2001 ekonomi Indonesia mengalami ketidakstabilan makro yang 
bersumber dari hilangnya kepercayaan para pelaku ekonomi terhadap kebijakan 
pemerintah. Di sini ditunjukkan langkah-langkah apa yang diambil untuk mengembalikan 
kepercayaan tersebut, hambatan-hambatan apa yang dihadapi dalam praktek terutama 
karena Indonesia juga sedang mengalami masa transisi politk yang mendasar. Prinsip 
ekonomi yang melandasi kebijakan pemerintah cukup sederhana, namun yang rumit adalah 
penerapannya dalam praktek. Hambatan politik-ekonomi itu satu per satu diselesaikan dan 
hasilnya adalah ekonomi Indonesia yang stabil dalam tahun 2004. Satu hal yang belum 
dapat dicapai pada waktu itu adalah bagaimana meningkatkan investasi dan pertumbuhan 
ekonomi yang cukup tinggi untuk mengurangi pengangguran dan kemiskinan. Ini 
memerlukan pembenahan struktural untuk memperbaiki iklim usaha dan iklim investasi 
yang sifatnya berjangka menegah dan panjang. Inilah tantangan yang harus ditanggulangi 
oleh pemerintahan sekarang tanpa mengorbankan stabilitas ekonomi yang sudah dicapai. 
Keywords: Government policy, fiscal policy, monetary policy. 
 
This paper is about government policies to 
stabilize an economy suffering from prolonged 
consequences of a financial crisis while the 
country is undergoing a profound political 
change. That problem setting is a rough 
depiction of what Indonesia has been facing in 
the past seven years or so. My story relates to 
the last three years of that period, drawing on 
my own experience as a member of the 
economic team in the Megawati government. 
My account of the events will inevitably be 
personal and therefore subjective. I do not 
know whether lessons can be learnt for other 
countries, but I do think that Indonesia should 
learn from the experience. I will proceed by 
describing first the basic thoughts behind the 
policy, then the environment in which the 
policy had to be implemented and finally the 
results of the policy. 
THE POLICY 
Let me start with the background that 
influenced the policy. 
Indonesia has passed the worst of the crisis, 
thanks to the early efforts at stabilization. 
However, when the Megawati government 
took office in August 2001, that is full four 
years after the crisis began, the economic 
situation of the country was still far from 
normal. Growth was feeble at the annual level 
of 3 per cent, the Rupiah was excessively 
depreciated and very volatile, inflation and the 
basic interest rate were at the high teens, our 
public debt was as big as our GDP, and 
although the worst had past capital was still 
flowing out of the country on a significant 
scale. Our relation with the IMF with whom 
we still had an ongoing program, and by 
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extension our relation with the international 
community at large, was at a low point, which 
of course did not help. 
Since most of us in the economic team 
were close observers of the country’s 
development before we joined the cabinet, we 
were able to quickly come to a diagnosis of the 
problem. We agreed that the cause of all the 
troubles was in fact a general lack of 
confidence among economic actors in the 
prospects of the economy. It was the case of 
runaway expectations that needed to be 
anchored. More specifically, we saw that the 
root of the problem was the widespread 
perception that there was no credible economic 
program with credible implementation. 
As the first step in our bid to restore 
credibility and regain market confidence we 
immediately reopened our negotiation with the 
IMF. After a marathon discussion for two 
weeks, we were able to come to an agreed 
program. We were also aware that the negative 
perception was partly caused by the fact that in 
the past numerous policy actions were 
promised but undelivered. So we took extra 
care in negotiating the details of the program. 
We wanted to minimize the risk of broken 
promises. We in the economic team agreed to 
deliberately tone down our rhetoric, especially 
when we talked to the market. 
Without going into the details, the core of 
the program focused on two themes: fiscal 
consolidation and financial sector (especially 
banking sector) restructuring. These were the 
two areas where, in our view, the market most 
wanted assurance from the government. On 
these two policy themes we were in substantial 
agreement with the Fund. The main objective 
was to trigger a kind of “virtuous cycle” where 
improved confidence would lead to more 
stable and stronger Rupiah, lower inflation, 
lower interest rate and higher growth. We were 
hoping that the improved confidence would 
eventuate as the market began to believe that 
we meant what we said. 
Given the prevailing situation at that time, 
we frankly did not see any alternative 
“models” that could give us better light or 
more helpful guide for actions than the one 
implied in the program. Our study indicated 
that similar mechanism had worked in other 
crisis hit countries, and I learnt it also had in 
the United States during the first Clinton 
period. So we launched the program with a bit 
of confidence of our own. 
The swiftly agreed program with the Fund 
immediately soothed the market. But it 
presented the government with some problems 
in the domestic politics. Our relations with the 
IMF had been a contentious issue all along. In 
the ambience of prevailing politics, even an 
agreement resulting from earnest discussions 
and a long process of negotiation, as it was, 
could easily be depicted as a proof that the 
government succumbed to the Fund’s wishes. 
Without appropriate management of the 
situation, that could spell problems for the 
implementation of the program. I will come 
back to this later. 
THE ENVIRONMENT 
The policy had to be put to work in the real 
world setting. The environment in which the 
policy was to be implemented clearly had an 
important influence on the outcome. Here I can 
only give you a partial sense of it by describing 
the implications of three issues: first, the 
extended process of political transition; 
second, the controversies surrounding our 
relations with the IMF and third, the problem 
of coordination between the government and 
the central bank. 
There is little doubt that the lingering 
uncertainties associated with the extended 
process of political transition have been a 
central factor in Indonesia’s slow economic 
recovery. Complications arise when we 
implement economic policy in a fluid 
environment, where the basic rules of the game 
are not well established. Although some 




generally been the policy environment in 
Indonesia in the past seven years and likely for 
some years to come. 
During the Habibie period the political 
situation was very unsettled. I cannot 
remember a single day passed by without a 
demonstration in front of my office in 
Bappenas.
1
 When Abdurrahman Wahid took 
the presidency over noisy public oppositions 
began to subside but then the relation between 
the government and the all powerful par-
liament grew increasingly strained, culmi-
nating in a change of government. During the 
subsequent Megawati administration public 
protests were still occurring, though more 
occasionally, but the relation with the 
parliament began to improve. However, one 
problem has persisted, namely the rules of the 
game governing institutions continue to be 
fuzzy. That has often created problems when a 
policy is being implemented on the ground. 
Let me elaborate it a little. 
The cabinet was not immune to the “fuzzy 
rules” problem. As a result, the fate of your 
proposed policy depended, more crucially than 
in the more established system, on your 
personal approach and rapport with key 
cabinet members and of course with the 
president. 
The “fuzzy rules” problem presented itself 
most notably in the decision making process 
that involved the parliament. Although as I 
said earlier the relation between the govern-
ment and the parliament during the Megawati 
period had begun to improve, to secure the 
necessary approvals from the parliament for a 
policy continued to be an uncertain and, often, 
long and winding exercise. 
In the environment of change where the 
balance of power between the executive 
branch and the legislative branch had been 
                                                          
1  For an account of policy making process during the 
Habibie government, see Boediono, “The IMF Support 
Program in Indonesia: Comparing Its Implementation 
Under Three Presidents”, in Bulletin of Indonesian 
Economic Studies, Vol. 3, December 2002.  
radically redefined, many grey areas emerged 
when you put the system into practice on the 
floor of the parliament. So, when a policy 
proposal was tabled, a considerable amount of 
time often had to be expended on agreeing on 
procedures as much as on the substance. I do 
not know whether that is also the case in other 
countries. But being no politician myself, at 
times I found it to be rather confusing, and a 
bit exhausting. 
In spite of those hurdles we were able to 
get most of the major policies approved and 
the necessary legislations passed. 
Let me now turn to our relations with the 
IMF. As I mentioned earlier this was a 
contentious issue all along. The group 
expressing disapproval of the IMF, and our 
involvement with it, was in fact an amorphous 
one. It included those who were ideologically 
against international capitalism and 
globalization, those who had joined in the 
recent waves of criticisms of the Bretton 
Woods institutions, those who squarely blamed 
the IMF for getting us into the terrible crisis, 
those who did not like to see us being “ordered 
around” by the IMF, and those who had a 
general dislike of any Western creation. 
Be that as it may, the government was 
placed in a dilemmatic position. On the one 
hand, we in the government saw the imperative 
of getting the support of the IMF in order to 
implement the necessary policies to win back 
market confidence. On the other hand, we 
knew that it was unpopular. But we opted to 
implement the policies and tried to manage the 
situation as best as we could. 
In the cabinet there was none like a 
consensus view. Fortunately, there were two 
things that saved the situation. First, the three 
ministers most directly concerned with the 
program with the IMF (that is, the coordinating 
minister, the minister of finance and the 
minister for state enterprises) and the central 
bank governor shared a more or less common 
view. Second, the presidential cabinet system, 
even though it was formed through some kind 
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of coalition building processes, meant that the 
bottom line for a policy was the consent of the 
president. Most of our proposals eventually got 
approval or support from the president, though 
often only an implicit one. 
In the parliament the broad questions 
relating to our continued engagement with the 
Fund had of course surfaced from time to time. 
But it turned out that intensive debates 
generally occurred on specific policies, such as 
the fiscal policy stance, subsidies, privatization 
plan, bank restructuring policy and the many 
draft laws that the government proposed. I 
must say that it was a relief to learn that the 
more political issues on the IMF had not 
distracted the focus on specific policies. I 
guess if you are an optimist you may take it as 
a testimony that however imperfect it might 
still be, democracy in Indonesia could lead to 
results. My experience also indicated that even 
in the rough and tumble of politics the usual 
human dynamic was at work and personal 
approach made a difference. As by necessity 
we interacted with each other more intensively, 
better rapport developed and smoother 
discussions followed. 
In contrast to what happened in the cabinet 
and in the parliament, in public forums our 
program with the Fund continued to be a 
favorite sport for commentators. Here, I think 
part of the problem lay with the government 
who had not done well in explaining its 
policies to the public. The present government 
seems to realize this and is making some effort 
to remedy it. But I suspect the question of our 
relations with the Fund and indeed with the 
international community at large will continue 
to be an issue that has to be managed with 
caution for some years to come. 
A good coordination between fiscal policy 
and monetary policy, and more to the point 
between the government and the central bank, 
is obviously key to any successful stabilization 
program. Yet it was precisely this one thing 
that was missing during much of the 
Abdurrahman Wahid period, with the 
inevitable consequence of continually eluding 
stability. The relation between the two vitally 
important institutions for macroeconomic 
stability was then under such strain that 
substantive communications between them 
practically ceased. 
Looking back, the reason for it appears to 
be as much about substance (that is central 
bank’s independence versus its accountability) 
as about “practical politics” that had broken 
loose and clashes of personality. The situation 
was clearly untenable that its resolution must 
be at the top of the list for the new 
government. But to do that some sticking 
points needed to be ironed out. 
The most sensitive matter related to some 
articles in the revision of the central bank law 
earlier proposed by the government, which 
central bank officials regarded as a thinly 
veiled plot to remove the incumbent governor 
and some members of the board. The new 
government agreed to drop the controversial 
articles thus relieving immediately an 
important source of tension. However, other 
items that contained proposed improvements in 
the accountability of the central bank had 
remained on the agenda. Although the debates 
on the law dragged on until mid 2003 when the 
law was finally passed, the relations between 
the central bank and the government, thanks to 
efforts by officials on both sides, had progres-
sively improved since that initial gesture. 
The second sticking point was the question 
of how to share the burden of the liquidity 
support that Bank Indonesia provided, and 
much of it was lost, to avert the collapse of the 
banking sector during the crisis. Since the 
Abdurrahman Wahid period the issue had 
become so politicized that it was impossible to 
come to a rational solution. It was only well 
into the Megawati era that, after many 
meetings, the central bank and the government 
agreed to move forward by seeking the view of 
an independent party (which happened to be 
Paul Volcker and associates). It was also 
agreed, wisely I think, to involve the 
parliament early to smoothen the approval 
process. In 2003 the issue was at last resolved. 
Again the experience in resolving the coor-




the central bank demonstrates that personal 
gestures and approaches do matter, sometimes 
a lot. 
THE RESULTS 
We now come to the results of the policy. 
Did it work? I think the answer is yes, but 
with one qualification. Over the three years, 
from the third quarter 2001 to the third quarter 
2004, the Rupiah had strengthened apprecia-
bly, the exchange rates had become steadier, 
inflation and basic interest rate had dropped 
from high teens to respectively around 6 per 
cent and slightly below 7.5 per cent, public 
debt to GDP ratio had declined from close to 
100 per cent to around 60 per cent and was 
projected to continue declining, budget deficit 
had been contained below 2 per cent of GDP 
even during the elections year of 2004, over-
seas funds were returning and one indicator of 
market confidence – the Jakarta stock price 
index – had almost doubled from around 370 
to over 800 (it has now passed 1000). 
Over those three years economic growth 
had edged up steadily from an annual growth 
of around 3 per cent to around 5 per cent. But 
many think, and I agree with them, that this is 
a rather unremarkable performance conside-
ring other economies equally hard hit by the 
crisis, such as Korea and Thailand, had 
rebounded very strongly once they passed the 
worst phase of the crisis. Certainly, that level 
of growth had hardly made a dent on the 
biggest social problem confronting us post-
crisis – namely, unemployment – which has 
persisted at around 10 per cent with signs of 
worsening recently. One estimate suggests that 
the country has to grow in the range of 6 – 7 
per cent for at least 3 – 4 years before one sees 
a firm turnaround in the unemployment rate. 
Why didn’t growth pick up more quickly? 
If we look at the numbers we see that for the 
most part of the past three years the main 
driving force of growth was consumption 
spending while investment and exports were 
weak. Seven years after the crisis the 
investment ratio was still closer to the crisis 
level of around 20 per cent of GDP than to the 
typical 30 per cent level before the crisis. And 
despite the substantial depreciation of the 
Rupiah, non-oil exports continued to be 
sluggish. 
It is clear that the last link in the “virtuous 
cycle” that we projected, lower interest rates 
that would lead to higher growth, was still 
missing. It seems to me that there existed some 
“supply side” hurdles and institutional 
constraints that had stood between the return of 
stability and lower interest rates on the one 
hand and the revival in investment and growth 
on the other. 
One important hurdle – political uncer-
tainties surrounding the elections and change 
of government - is now gone. However, other 
constraints have remained because many of 
them by their nature can only be overcome in 
the medium or long term. This is a vitally 
important policy theme that should be the 
focus of the new government. Concrete 
problems in such areas as legal processes, 
taxation and customs, labor laws and regional 
regulations have been a constant complaint by 
investors. They have to be dealt with. Some 
steps have been initiated, but much remains to 
be done. What we need now, I think, is a fully 
worked out medium term action plan focusing 
on the improvement in business and 
investment climate. 
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